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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla intiff-Respondent, 
• 
-vs- Case No. 
: 14116 
ELIZABETH MULLINS, 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
A p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h t h e c r i m e o f r e c e i v i n g 
s t o l e n p r o p e r t y . 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On A p r i l 2 3 , 1975 # the matter was tried by the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, J r . , sitting without a jury. 
Appellant was found guilty of the crime of theft by receiving 
and was sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and was placed on two 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
y e a r s p r o b a t i o n i n l i e u o f impr i sonmen t p r o v i d e d t h e 
f i n e i s p a i d . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
R e s p o n d e n t s e e k s an a f f i r m a n c e o f t h e c o n v i c -
t i o n . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
D u r i n g t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s o f t h e 2 7 t h 
day o f A u g u s t , 1974 , t h e I n t e r m o u n t a i n G l a s s Company 
i n S a l t Lake C i t y was b u r g l a r i z e d and numerous t o o l s 
were t a k e n ( T . 8 , 9 ) . The b u r g l a r y was c o m m i t t e d b y 19 
y e a r o l d A l l e n V a n o v e r , 20 y e a r o l d C h a r l i e Brown, a n d 
some o t h e r y o u t h s ( T . 5 5 ) . A f t e r t h e b u r g l a r y , t h e two 
b o y s t o o k t h e c a r l o a d of s t o l e n i t e m s t o t h e home o f 
a p p e l l a n t who i s A l l e n ' s a u n t . About t e n o ' c l o c k a . m . 
t h e b o y s made a d e a l w i t h a p p e l l a n t w h e r e i n s h e a g r e e d 
t o pay t h e boys $250 f o r t h e c a r l o a d of t o o l s ( T . 6 6 , 
149-150) . 
A p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t s h e was t o l d by t h e 
b o y s t h a t t h e t o o l s b e l o n g e d t o C h a r l i e ' s f a t h e r 
- 2 -
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(T.149) . However, b o t h b o y s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y had 
made up t h i s s t o r y and t o l d a p p e l l a n t t o use i t i f 
t h e p o l i c e a s k e d q u e s t i o n s , and t h a t a p p e l l a n t 
d e f i n i t e l y knew t h e t o o l s we re s t o l e n ( T . 6 7 # 1 0 0 ) . Both 
boys had l ong c r i m i n a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n b u r g l a r i e s and 
s t e a l i n g ( T . 5 6 , 7 3 , 1 0 6 # 1 0 8 ) a n d b o t h t e s t i f i e d t h a t 
t h e y h a d s o l d a p p e l l a n t s t o l e n t o o l s a n d o t h e r goods on 
many p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s ( T . 8 0 # 9 9 ) . 
A s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d i n O c t o b e r , 1974 , was 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y s e r v e d a t a p p e l l a n t ' s r a n c h i n Duchesne 
C o u n t y , U t a h . At t h i s t i m e t h e s t o l e n t o o l s from 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n G l a s s were r e c o v e r e d a l o n g w i t h o t h e r 
s t o l e n p r o p e r t y from o t h e r b u r g l a r i e s . (Record on A p p e a l , 
page 5 2 . ) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE CAN BE DECIDED WITHOUT QUESTIONING 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE. 
The Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
h o l d s t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s w i l l b e a v o i d e d i f 
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The Supreme Court of the United S ta tes 
holds t h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s sues w i l l be avoided 
if cases can be decided on other grounds. Johnson 
v . Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 
389 (1974) . The Utah Supreme Court a l so has such a 
r u l e . State v . T r i t t , 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 
(1970) 7 Clinton City v . Pa t te rson , 20 Utah 2d 70, 
433 P.2d 7 (1967). Respondent submits t ha t t h e present 
case can, and therefore should, be decided without 
reference to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e which 
the l e g i s l a t u r e of the State of Utah has deemed 
worthy of enactment. 
Appellant was convicted of receiving s to len 
proper ty , a crime under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
(Supp. 19 73) : 
"A person commits thef t 
i f he rece ives , r e t a i n s , or d i s -
poses of the property of another 
knowing tha t i t has been s to len 
. . . with a purpose to deprive the 
owner thereof.11 
- 4 -
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Appellant admitted that she received t h e 
s to len proper ty (T.157) • Therefore, the only r e a l 
issue was whether or not s t e knew the property she 
purchased was s t o l e n . 
The finder of fac t found that appellant did 
know the t o o l s were s t o l en . On appeal the evidence 
should be viewed in the l igh t most favorable to th i s 
verdic t of convic t ion. State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 
341 P.2d 865 (1959) ; State v . Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960). The f inde r -o f - f ac t , in t h i s 
case the d i s t r i c t court judge, was i n the best pos i t ion 
to observe the f a c i a l express ions , mannerisms and tone 
of voice of witnesses and thus was in the best pos i t ion 
to weigh the evidence. Those kinds of judgments a re 
d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, t o make on appeal . By 
examining the evidence, however, i t i s obvious tha t 
the judge 's ve rd ic t is heavily supported by the 
evidence. The verdic t w i l l not be overturned on appeal 
unless i t appears tha t the evidence was so inconclusive 
- 5 -
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or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have 
entered reasonable doubts that the crime was 
committed. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 . 
P.2d 212 (1957); State v. Danks, 19 Utah 2d 162# 
350 P.2d 146 (1960) . In other words, the strong 
presumption is that the trial verdict is correct. 
Appellant, to prevail, has the burden to prove that 
the verdict was unreasonable, and this she has 
failed to do. 
At t r i a l , a d i s t r i c t cour t j u s t i c e found 
that t he re was not a reasonable doubt of g u i l t . As 
the fac ts are examined i t is obvious tha t the 
judge ' s ve rd i c t i s more than adequately supported by 
the evidence. On t h e o the r hand, the testimony of 
appel lant i s highly improbable and amounts to nothing 
more than se l f -serv ing p r o t e s t a t i o n s of innocence. 
This court has pointed out many t imes: 
"A f inder of fact i s not 
n e c e s s a r i l y bound to accept as 
conclusive a testimony of a 
wi tness . His c r e d i b i l i t y may 
be impeached by s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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or improbabil i ty so that i t 
would be e n t i r e l y within the 
realm of reason to discount or 
to e n t i r e l y d i s c r ed i t i t . " 
Nichol v . Wall, 122 Utah 589, 
253 P.2d 355# 356 (1953). 
See a l so Strong v . Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294# 452 P.2d 323, 
324 (1969) , wherein the Court sa id tha t s e l f - i n t e r e s t may 
j u s t i f y non-acceptance of test imony. 
Appellant would have the Court bel ieve tha t 
she bought some t o o l s from two youths (T.125, 86) , one 
of whom she had never seen before (T.146), s igh t unseen 
(T.155-156), for two hundred and f i f t y d o l l a r s . Of t h i s 
testimony the D i s t r i c t Court Judge sa id : 
"The fact tha t t ha t much 
property was del ivered, placed in 
a garage, and sold in ef fec t s i g h t -
unseen for $250 with no quest ions 
who, how, why, when, or where / " t e n d s 
to prove g u i l t .J7" (T.177) . 
Based on ordinary human experience a p p e l l a n t ' s testimony 
i s very d i f f i c u l t to be l i eve . 
Four persons were present when the sale of t h e 
s tolen goods took p lace : Allen Vanover and Char l ie Brown 
were se l l i ng s to len proper ty , appel lant was buying stolen 
- 7 -
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proper ty , and a p p e l l a n t ' s daughter was around the house 
somewhere. The daugher i s a poor witness to the 
t r ansac t ion since she admitted that she was paying 
l i t t l e , i f any, a t t e n t i o n to what was going on. 
She s a i d : 
"A. No, I was busy 
around the house, r e a l l y . 
Q. So I take i t — 
A. I only grasped pa r t 
of the conversat ion there* 
Q. I take i t then t h a t 
your mother j u s t purchased some 
unknown quant i ty of too l s? 
A. I don ' t know t h a t , 
s i r , I was in d i f fe ren t p a r t s 
of the house ." . 
So for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, only th ree people witnessed 
the t r a n s a c t i o n . 
Appellant claims t h a t she had never met Char l ie 
before (T.146), but bought an unknown quant i ty of too l s 
from him, s ight-unseen (T.155) . Allen and Char l ie both 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t she previously knew Charl ie (T.93,94) , 
and both boys t e s t i f i e d tha t she examined the too l s 
-8 
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before paying $250 for them (T.65,97). Again, 
based on human exper ience , the boys1 s to ry i s much more 
reasonable. 
Appellant claimed that she d id not know the 
t o o l s were s to l en (T.149) . Both of the boys, hcwever, 
t e s t i f i e d tha t she knew they were s to len (T.66,96) . 
Allen t e s t i f i e d that he had sold her other s to len items, 
including t oo l s (T.77)# on at l e a s t s i x or seven separate 
occasions (T.80) . Charl ie t e s t i f i e d that he had been 
present a t l e a s t three other times when stolen goods 
were sold to appel lant by Allen or himself (T.99) . The 
testimony of the boys was corroborated by the fact t ha t 
appel lant had in her possession a ca lcu la to r which was 
s to len seven months previous to t h e time appellant 
purchased s to len goods in this case (T.45) • Appellant 
a lso had an e l e c t r i c a l t o o l a lso s to len some months 
previous (T.51) . Since Allen was only 19 years old 
(T.125) and Charl ie was only 20 (T.86), and since both had 
long h i s t o r i e s of bu rg l a r i e s and convict ions (T.73,56,109)
 # 
- 9 -
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i t i s much more reasonable to be l ieve tha t appel lant 
knew she was buying stolen goods than i t i s to assume 
she was so g u l l i b l e as to bel ieve that the young men 
acquired t he large amount of t o o l s l e g a l l y . 
Appellant a l leged tha t she was told t h a t 
the t o o l s belonged to Brown's father (T.149) . Both 
of the boys, however, t e s t i f i e d t h a t th i s was an 
a l i b i which they themselves had invented and which 
they suggested to appel lant for use in case the 
pol ice asked any questions (T.67,100). 
Respondent contends, that the ve rd i c t of the 
t r i a l judge, s i t t i n g without a ju ry , i s fu l ly reason-
able and adequately supported by f ac t s f bes ides being 
supported by many inferences drawn from ordinary human 
experience* Respondent submits that the evidence was 
not so inconclusive or unsa t i s fac to ry tha t reasonable 
minds would have reasonable doubts t h a t the crime was 
committed. Danks# supra . Respondent fu r ther contends 
-10-
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t h a t a p p e l l a n t h a s f a i l e d t o c a r r y h e r b u r d e n of p r o v i n g 
t h e v e r d i c t t o b e u n r e a s o n a b l e . 
R e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e c o n v i c t i o n should 
b e a f f i r m e d and t h a t t h e r e i s no need t o c o n s i d e r t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e p a s s e d by t h e Utah S t a t e 
L e g i s l a t u r e . 
POINT I I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 8 (SUPP. 1 9 7 3 ) , IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
R e s p o n d e n t r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s c a s e 
c a n , and s h o u l d , be d e c i d e d w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a s t a t u t e . However, even i f i t were 
o t h e r w i s e , t h e s t a t u t e i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The s p e c i f i c 
p r o v i s i o n o f t h e Utah Code which a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t o be 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 8 (Supp . 19 7 3 ) : 
" (1) A p e r s o n commits t h e f t 
i f he r e c e i v e s , r e t a i n s , o r d i s p o s e s of 
t h e p r o p e r t y o f a n o t h e r , knowing t h a t 
i t h a s been s t o l e n . . . 
(2) The knowledge o r b e l i e f 
r e q u i r e d f o r p a r a g r a p h (1) i s p resumed 
i n t h e c a s e of a n a c t o r w h o : 
(a) I s found i n p o s s e s s i o n of 
c o n t r o l of o t h e r p r o p e r t y s t o l e n on a 
s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n ; o r 
(b) Has r e c e i v e d o t h e r s t o l e n 
p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e y e a r p r e c e d i n g t h e 
r e c e i v i n g o f f e n s e c h a r g e d . " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This statute creates a statutory presumption. In other 
words the legislature has decided, for good reasons, 
to incorporate an ordinary presumption into the law. 
The operation of a presumption can be described 
thus: if one fact is proved because of common experience 
a second fact may be presumed. Everyone uses presumptions 
every day, mostly subconciously. Of course the strength 
of the presumption rests on the strength of the common 
experience. If it is very general or universal, the 
presimption may be so strong that the second fact is not 
only presumed but essentially proved. 
Let us examine the statute in question and see 
how strong its basis is. Common experience dictates 
that the vast majority of people do not intentionally 
receive stolen goods. In other words, receiving stolen 
property unintentionally is unusual. Furthermore, 
unintentional reception twice is even more unusual• 
Finally, common experience tells us that unintentionally 
receiving stolen property twice within twelve months 
is highly unlikely. Therefore, if it is proved that a 
-12-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
person received s tolen goods twice in a year# and i f 
i t i s highly unl ikely t ha t he did so un in t en t iona l ly , 
then i t may be presumed tha t he did so with knowledge 
tha t the goods are s t o l en . 
One other var iab le i s important i n the equation* 
The common experience element may be ava i lab le to some 
people more than o the r s . Because of a d o c t o r ' s special 
experience he could, given c e r t a i n f a c t s , presume other 
fac ts which ordinary people would be incompetent to 
presume. Likewise, s t a t e congressmen have access t o 
f a c t s , f igures and experiences which give them g rea t ly 
enhanced competency to make presumptions. Because of 
t h i s , and a l so because of the way the l e g i s l a t i v e process 
works (exhaustive review) , a presumption created by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e i s given great weight by the courts of 
t h i s S t a t e . Norton v . Department of Employment, 22 
Utah 2d 24# 447 P.2d 907 (1968) . In f ac t , the Utah 
Supreme Court has held t h a t such business i s a matter 
s t r i c t l y for the congress and not for the cour t s : 
- 1 3 -
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"Whether the wearing of 
the helmet is likely to reduce 
accidents . . . is a matter for 
the legislative body to determine 
and not for the courts." State v. 
Acker, 26 Utah 2d 104# 485 P.2d 
1038 (1971) . 
Because a presumption is based on probabili-
ties, it is, of course, not a fact. Therefore, a 
presumption is always rebuttable by evidence to the 
contrary. After all, there is the possibility that any 
given case contains the exception to the rule. ' Statutory 
presumptions are the same way, an initial presumption 
may prove to be invalid when exceptional circumstances 
are shown to exist. This idea is embodied in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-503 (Supp. 1973): 
"Presumption of fact. - An 
evidentiary presumption established 
by this code or other penal statute 
has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts 
which support the presumption exist, 
the issue of the existence of the 
presumed fact must be submitted to 
the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly 
negates the presumpted fact. 
-14-
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(2) In submitting the issue 
of the exis tence of a presumed fact 
to the ju ry , the court s h a l l charge 
tha t while the presumed fac t must 
on a l l evidence be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the law regards 
the fac t s giving r i s e to the p r e -
sumption as evidence of the presumed 
f a c t . " 
Therefore, under the Utah Code, a s t a tu to ry pissumption 
i s r ebu t t ab le and harmless t o the innocent defendant. 
The Supreme Court of the United S ta tes has 
discussed s t a t u t o r y presumptions in a l ine of cases 
ending with Leary v . United S t a t e s , 395 U.S. 6, 89 
S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1968); Turner v . United 
S t a t e s , 396 U.S. 398# 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 
(1969)# and Barnes v . United S t a t e s , 412 U.S. 837, 
93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973). From t h i s l ine 
of cases , two t e s t s have emerged to help determine the 
v a l i d i t y of a s t a tu to ry presumption. P r io r to Leary, 
supra, a s t a t u to ry presumption was considered con-
s t i t u t i o n a l i f in accordance with common experience 
there was a r a t i o n a l connection between the fact proved 
and the fac t presumed. United S ta te s v . Gainev, 380 
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U.S. 63, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); United 
S ta tes v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136f 86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed. 
2d 310 (1965) . The Court in Leary subs t i tu t ed a new 
t e s t in place of t h i s " r a t i o n a l connection" t e s t by 
holding tha t the fac t proved must "more l i k e l y than 
not" lead t o the fact presumed. In Turner, supra, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the use of t h i s "more 
l i k e l y than not" t e s t . 
Another t e s t has been proposed which would 
hold t h a t the proven fact must lead t o the presumed 
fact "without a reasonable doubt." This t e s t has 
not been adopted by the Supreme Court although they 
have ind ica ted t h a t they may consider i t as t h e 
standard in the f u t u r e . In Barnes, supra, the Court 
said tha t i f a presumption passed the "more l i k e l y 
than not" t e s t and the "reasonable doubt" t e s t i t 
would c e r t a i n l y be okay but the court did not ind ica te 
whether one or the other alone would su f f i c e . 
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The s t a tu to ry presumption in t h i s case 
c l ea r ly passes the present t e s t . I t can eas i ly be 
sa id t h a t i f a person i s proved to have received 
s to len goods twice in a year, then more l ike ly than 
not he knew they were s t o l e n . Even i f a court were, 
in the fu ture , to use the "reasonable doubt" standard# 
t h i s presumption would probably pass t ha t t e s t a l s o , 
e spec ia l ly in l igh t of the fact tha t the Utah Code 
has provided tha t the presumption i s rebut table and 
tha t g u i l t must s t i l l be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt* In Barnes, supra# the most recent case on t h i s 
subjec t , a man was convicted of possessing r ecen t ly 
s to len p roper ty . The t r i a l judge ins t ruc ted the jury 
t h a t : 
" . . . possession of 
recen t ly s tolen proper ty , i f not 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explained, i s 
o r d i n a r i l y a circumstance from 
which you may reasonably draw 
the inference and f ind i n the 
l igh t of the surrounding c i r -
cumstances shown by the evidence 
in t h e case, tha t the person in 
possession knew the property had 
been s to l en . " 412 U.S. a t 839, 
840. 
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This presumption was held to be va l id 
by the Supreme Court. 
The above i n s t r u c t i o n i s much the same as 
the s t a t u t e in the present case . However, t h e r e i s 
one d i f fe rence , the above in s t ruc t ion says tha t from 
possession of r ecen t ly s to len property one may infer 
knowledge. In the present case , the re must be posses -
sion of property from at l e a s t two d i f f e ren t t h e f t s . 
So the present presumption i s even stronger than the 
one held by the Supreme Court to be s u f f i c i e n t . 
Respondent r e spec t fu l ly submits tha t the 
Utah s t a t u t o r y presumption in quest ion i s c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l ; i t i s adequately supported by common experience; 
i t i s supported by holdings of the United Sta tes 
Supreme Court ; i t i s harmless to an innocent man since 
the Utah Code provides t h a t i t i s rebu t tab le by other 
evidence; i t was made law by the Leg i s l a tu re of the 
Sta te of Utah; and f i n a l l y , the presumption i s supported 
by other evidence in the present case . Respondent 
r e spec t fu l ly r eques t s t h i s Court to affirm a p p e l l a n t ' s 
convic t ion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The p r e s e n t c a s e can b e d e c i d e d w i t h o u t 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s t a t u t e . 
However , even i f i t were o t h e r w i s e , t h e c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e s t a t u t e in q u e s t i o n i s s u p p o r t e d 
by d e c i s i o n s of t h e Supreme C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n s h o u l d b e a f f i r m e d . 
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